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The collective security structure created by the U.N. Charter is
becoming shakier than ever, and two recent trends pose particular challenges
to Charter rules on the use of force. The first trend involves a normative shift
in understandings of state sovereignty, and the second trend involves
improvements in technology -- specifically, the rapid evolution of unmanned
aerial vehicles, precision weapons, and surveillance technologies. Each trend
on its own raises difficult issues. Together, they further call into question
international law’s ability to meaningfully constrain the use of force by
states.
1.

Changes in normative understandings of sovereignty

The last two decades have seen a dramatic shift away from traditional
ideas about state soveignty. Increasingly, both legal scholars and national
and international-level advocates and political decision-makers have
articulated an understanding of state sovereignty as limited and subject to
what amounts to de facto waiver. In this vision of sovereignty, a state is
required to execute certain responsibilities. If it fails to do so, external actors
have a right and/or an obligation to step in themselves to ensure proper
execution of these responsibilities.
Versions of these arguments have emerged recently in two very
different discourse communities. One is the human rights community, in
which this vision of sovereignty is often couched in terms of atrocity
prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. Parallel versions of this
argument have also emerged from within the national security community.
1
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Here, the argument is generally couched in terms of state duties to prevent
the export of terrorism.
The Responsibility to Protect
Start with the Responsibility to Protect. By the beginning of the
twenty-first century, the 1990s’ debates over humanitarian intervention had
morphed into discussion of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P, a doctrine
initially developed by the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (ICISS). In a 2001 report, ICISS offered a starkly different
understanding of sovereignty than that taken for granted prior to World War
II:
State sovereignty implies responsibility…Where a
population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war,
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question
is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of nonintervention yields to the international responsibility to
protect.1
ICISS was careful to note that the use of military force to proect
populations should be a last resort, and that any R2P-based military
interventions should be authorized by the Security Council. But ICISS was
unwilling to view Security Council authorization as an absolute requirement:
“If the Security Council rejects a proposal [to intervene
to protect a population] or fails to deal with it in a reasonable
time, alternative options…[include] action within area of
jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organizations under
Chapter VIII of the Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent
authorization.”
After all, warned ICISS, if the Council “fails to discharge its
responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for
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action… concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity
and urgency of that situation…” 2
Within a decade, the R2P concept had gained substantial
traction throughout the ineternational community. It was referenced in the
2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document, and in 2011, the Security
Council referenced R2P in Resolution 1973, which authorized the use of
force to protect civilians in Libya, as well as Resolution 1975, authorizing
the use of force in Cote D’Ivoire.3
While most post-ICISS elaborations of R2P have -- for obvious
reasons -- tended to downplay the possibility of military interventions
undertaken without Security Council authorization, the normative logic of
R2P suggests that Security Council authorization should not be dispositive.
As Anne Orford put it in her remarks, the R2P framework implies that the
lawfulness of state authority is dependent on the capacity and will to protect
populations from at least certain kinds of egregious harms. If sovereignty
involves a responsibility to protect, and a state’s failure to protect its own
population triggers a responsibility to protect in other states, this
responsibility must logically exist whether or not a politicized and highly
veto-prone body chooses to acknowledge it or authorize particular actions.
Counterterrorism and the “Unwilling or Unable” Test
We see strikingly similar logic at play in the counter-terrorism
discourse, at least in the United States. Only two months before ICISS
issued its initial report on the Responsibility to Protect, the terrorist attacks
of September 2011 shook up traditional notions of sovereignty, self-defense,
and armed conflict.
Prior to 9/11, most states accepted (publicly, at least) the general
international law principle that force could not be used inside the territory of
a sovereign state unless the state at issue consented, the Security Council had
authorized the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or the use
of force was in self-defense following an “armed attack” as delineated by
Article 51 of the UN Charter. Standard interpretations of the right to self2
3
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defense included the right to use force to prevent an “imminent” attack, but
for the most part, states construed the idea of imminence relatively
narrowly.4
But the 9/11 attacks made glaringly apparent the degree to which
globalization and its drivers (changes in transportation, communication and
weapons technologies, for instance) had democratized the means of mass
destruction, reduced the salience of international borders, and accelerated the
speed with which money and materiel could travel. Inevitably, these changes
undermined the logic of sovereign non-intervention principles—and within
the national security community, post-9/11counterterrorism concerns
sparked the rapid emergence of normative and legal arguments for
expanding the basis for using force within the territory of other states.
There were generally two strands to these arguments. First, the
traditional self-defense-based justification for using force was expanded,
most strikingly in the Bush Administration’s embrace of so-called
“preemptive” self-defense, which was used to justify the war in Iraq. The
logic underlying the Bush argument was straightforward (though the facts,
inconveniently, were not): in the age of ballistic missiles and nuclear,
chemical, and biological threats, states may only have a moment’s notice (if
any) before an imminent and devastating attack. Surely the framers of the
UN Charter would not have required states to wait for such and attack to
occur or be imminent, in the traditional sense, to lawfully use force in selfdefense.
This extension of the principle of self-defense stretches traditional
understandings of sovereignty—but the second strand of counterterrorismbased arguments justifying the use of force raises even more fundamental
challenges.
Consider drone strikes and other cross-border uses of force outside of
“hot” battlefields. Since 2011, the United States has repeatedly used force
inside the borders of sovereign states with which it is not at war, at times
without the consent of the affected state. In October 2008, for instance, US
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troops in Iraq crossed the Syrian border and attacked targets inside Syria.5
The United States has also attacked targets inside Pakistan, Yemen and
Somalia. In some cases, the affected states have consented to the United
States’ use of force. In other cases, their consent is, at best, questionable.6
While the United States has been reluctant to offer much detail or
legal justification for these actions, the logic relied upon appears structurally
identical to that embraced by proponents of the Responsibility to Protect:
sovereignty implies responsibilities as well as rights; states must refrain
from internal acts that threaten the citizens or basic security of other states,
and must prevent non-state entities from engaging in such acts inside their
borders. If a state fails to fulfill this responsibility—by, for instance,
harboring terrorists—other states are entitled to use force within its borders
if doing so is necessary to protect themselves or uphold global security.7 As
President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor John Brennan stated in a
2011 speech, “[The United States] reserve[s] the right to take unilateral
action if or when other governments are unwilling or unable to take the
necessary actions themselves.”8
The Convergence of Sovereignty-Limiting Theories
The human rights and national security discourses appear to be
converging on structurally parallel sovereignty-limiting theories, and each
serves to legitimize and reinforce the other, though neither the human rights
community nor the national security community is inclined to fully
acknowledge this.
One might even say that the R2P coin ought logically to be seen as
having two sides: On one side lies a state’s duty to take action inside its own
territory to protect its own population from violence and atrocities. On the
5
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other side lies a state’s duty to take action inside its own territory to protect
other states’ populations from violence. Either way, a state that fails in these
protective duties faces the prospect that other states will intervene in its
“internal” affairs without its consent, and quite possibly without the Security
Council’s consent.
To be clear, my purpose here is descriptive rather than prescriptive. I
do not assert that any of this is either wise or particularly close to being
settled law. R2P’s scope, meaning and legal status remain controversial, and
the US legal defense of recent drone strikes and other cross-border uses of
force is even more so. Nonetheless, each of these normative frameworks is
articulated with increasing frequency, each is couched in legal terms, and
each offers the raw materials from which states and other actors can
construct legally plausible arguments.
In and of themselves, these arguments raise obvious and glaring issues
for those concerned with the international rule of law. Whether a potential
use of force is justified on counterterrorism grounds or on humanitarian and
human rights grounds, the slippery slope is apparent. Who gets to judge
when a state should be deemed to have "waived" its sovereignty and
abrogated its responsibilities? Who gets to decide when a use of force inside
the border of a non-consenting state is lawful? How much force is
acceptable? And which actors get to use force? A single state acting
unilaterally? Regional organizations? Coalitions of the willing?
If each state begins to claim the right to judge for itself when force
can be used inside the borders of another state, the world will become an
even more frightening and unstable place, given the continued weakness of
most existing international institutions.

2.

Changing Technologies

The rapid evolution of these sovereignty-limiting doctrines has been
paralleled by a similarly rapid evolution in technologies that collectively
make cross-border uses of force less costly. Surveillance technologies have
improved dramatically in the last two decades, enabling powerful states to
more effectively and accurately determine the location, numbers and
motivations of actors they deem to pose security threats. Weapons
6
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technologies and delivery systems have also improved, enabling greater
precision in targetting and less collateral damage. And the development of
increasingly sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) not only assists
with intelligence-gathering and precision-targetting, but eliminates any
immediate risk to the military or intelligence personnel who control them.
Taken together, these technological changes reduce the risks and costs
of using force inside the borders of other sovereign states. Unmanned aerial
vehicles in particular have become a game-changer for the United States:
they’re substantially cheaper to make and maintain than manned aircraft;
they can spend much more “time on target,” which increases the likelihood
that a given strike will hit its only its intended target (rather than nearby
civilians, for instance), and their use poses no risk to their operators, who
remain safely far from the strike zone.
Compared to the methods available even fifteen years ago, today’s
surveillance and weapons technologies permit states to use force at lower
cost in both monetary and human terms. When targets are limited and welldefined, states no longer need to risk the lives of ground troops or human
pilots to strike targets, and can feel more confident that there will be no
significant civilian deaths (thus reducing the odds of international
condemnation). Strikes become more “surgical.” And this seems likely to
produce changes in state behavior: if states perceive the costs of using force
to be lower, their willingness to use force will be higher.
3.

When legal and technological trends intersect

The collective security structures created by the UN Charter have
always been shaky. Since its inception, the Charter’s rules on the use of
force have been stretched and strained. Nonetheless, states have hesitated to
pose direct challenges to the Charter framework, and it has so far maintained
a fragile integrity.
This may be in the process of changing. When sovereignty-limiting
theories such as R2P and the “unwilling or unable” counterterrorism
framework are available to states, the perceived reputational costs of using
force inside the borders of other sovereign states will go down. Combine
these normative and doctrinal developments with technological changes that
7
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reduce the financial and human cost of using of force inside other states
borders, and the threshold for using force will get lower still.
Proponents of R2P and counter-terrorism based sovereignty-limiting
theories need to acknowledge that both directly challenge the UN Charter’s
collective security framework. This may not be a bad thing: the world we
live in has changed substantially since 1945, both in terms of widely shared
normative assumptions and in terms of technology and risk.
But if the Charter system is being tacitly jettisoned, the least we can
do is acknowledge it, and begin the difficult project of developing new rules
and institutions to preserve peace in this new era. If we don’t, we risk a
return to the Hobbesian international order the Charter was designed to
eliminate.
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